All posts by Bryan Kavanagh

I'm a real estate valuer who worked in the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) before co-founding Westlink Consulting, a real estate valuation practice. I discovered, by leaving publicly-generated land rents to be privately capitalised by banks and individuals into escalating land price bubbles, this generates repetitive recessions and financial depressions. We need a tax-switch: from wages, profits and commodities onto economic rents/unearned incomes, if we are to create prosperity and minimise excessive private debt.

“Let’s Do the Time-Warp Again”

The Speculative Investment Pulse in 1880s Melbourne and Modern Parallels[1]

By: Paul Egan, David Collyer & Philip Soos

The regularity with which real-estate property bubbles have co-occurred with periods of financial instability and banking crises through recorded history is strongly suggestive that the likelihood of a future crisis may be ascertained by closely examining one’s own domestic history. Indeed, many modern day prophets of finance are unaware of basic economic conditions that attended previous severe downturns in Australia, such as the 1890s and 1930s depression. As a consequence, a veil of ignorance has descended upon the mainstream profession, blinding them to large private sector credit cycles that were mal-invested into asset bubbles – primarily the commercial and urban land markets in the 1880s and the stock market in the 1920s – that later burst with devastating force, causing the economy to contract, unemployment to sky rocket and banking crises to ensue, particularly during the earlier depression.

In the 1880s, like today, the Sydney and Melbourne land markets were the key hot spots for speculative investors, although Melbourne took clear first place, experiencing the greatest rise in land values and steepest compound annual rate of return on land. A manic investor herd was also very active at that time, with a seemingly inexhaustible line of greater fools chasing ephemeral capital gains by aggressively bidding prices upwards and rapidly flipping properties every few years. Investors squatted on land on the periphery of the major colonial centres, waiting for reclassification of the land use so they could receive windfall gains; an eerie parallel to today’s land bankers that tie up all fringe land around modern state/territory capitals. Eventually, after eight hard years of euphoria during which land was apparently a fool-proof investment (1880 – 1888), the dream ended and land prices collapsed. This destroyed untold wealth of investors during the process and caused extreme stress upon the domestic banks who had lent heavily into the land boom, tapping significant foreign capital in the process of blowing up the land bubble. The amount of credit extended to the non-financial business sector and the proportion advanced for real estate loans and pastoral securities confirms speculation was indeed rampant, centred in Melbourne.

From 1890 to 1892, 20 per cent of all bank advances were real estate loans and 67 per cent were backed by pastoral securities. Business bankruptcies and loan defaults accelerated as the market value of property and securities fell in the late 1880s.[2] Between 1880 and 1892, the reported weighted net annual rate of return on land (compounded) was 34.6 per cent, peaking at 78.3 per cent in 1887.[3] The average net annual rate of return was consistently high across the majority of regions in suburban Melbourne ranging from 28.6 per cent in the south-east up to 45.2 per cent in the north-west, meaning the land boom was not localized in its effect. During the period 1880 to 1892, Melbourne investors held their property for 3.7 years on average before realizing a sale. After 1884, many investors bought land purely for the purpose of lot sub-division (14 per cent of sampled observations), with the allotments in preferred and populous suburbs keenly sought due to the expectation of ongoing price rises that would allow investors to flip the property later for a quick profit. Some of the greatest gains in Melbourne land prices were seen in the 6 to 7 mile radius from the CBD. The reason was many land investors were purchasing semi-rural land with the expectation of a future change in land use gifting them a large windfall.

The average rate of return for acreage was greatest for those parcels sized between 50 to 100 acres, with a return of around 40 per cent a year. Returns on land (by year of sale) did not become negative in Melbourne until 1892, when lots and acreage saw a net annual rate of return of -4.5 per cent and -9.8 per cent, respectively. Except for 1881, 1884 and 1891 land returns were well above rates on deposits, overdraft and commercial paper, and even above yields on speculative gold mining companies. The sum of this information shows land investment was a highly profitable venture between 1880 and 1888, after which time land values and sales fell dramatically, and land forfeitures began to rise.[4] Average land prices in Sydney were estimated to have increased 80 per cent between 1880 and 1884. There are anecdotal reports of Melbournian city blocks almost doubling in value in months during 1887, with the peak of the land boom in Melbourne occurring a year later in 1888.[5]

Table 1.2.1: Melbourne Land Average Rate of Return 1880-1892[6]

Sector

Acres purchased and sold1

Total value (£)2

Average price per acre (£)

Average investment period (months)

Average net annual rate of return (%)

East

3,627

350,421

96.6

41.0

34.7

North

4,028

566,118

104.5

56.5

35.1

Northwest

549

79,954

145.6

31.2

45.2

Southeast

1,402

419,047

298.9

40.5

28.6

West

1,877

145,000

72.3

36.3

35.1

Total

11,483

1,560,540

Weighted average

135.9

43.8

34.6

Year of sale

Average investment period (mths)

Average net rate of return (%)

Lot sub-division3

Acreage

Lot sub-division

Acreage

1880

1881

13.5

4.1

1882

10.4

49.7

1883

8.4

41.4

1884

24.5

10.0

1885

72.9

29.4

55.8

44.7

1886

42.0

27.8

38.2

54.3

1887

34.6

38.7

94.8

61.8

1888

46.8

38.4

1889

45.2

61.8

24.3

32.0

1890

60.8

18.2

1891

23.8

8.4

1892

89.7

76.6

-4.5

-9.8

Weighted average

55.7

42.5

40.7

33.6

Annual Rate of Return (A) and Investment   Period (B) 1880 – 1892

Distance from CBD (miles)4

East

North

Northwest

Southeast

West

All sectors

A

B

A

B

A

B

A

B

A

B

A

B

4 – 5

37

20

29

68

12

108

18

107

48

17

33

45

5 – 6

23

45

44

45

45

38

24

41

62

86

34

44

6 – 7

46

69

40

50

66

26

36

34

27

38

39

41

7 – 8

36

28

7

85

4

12

31

87

9

11

27

38

Distance from CBD (miles)

Acreage size and rate of return 1880-1892   (%)

5-10

10-20

20-50

50-100

100+

4 – 5

29

23

26

61

5 – 6

27

43

9

48

6 – 7

60

41

38

25

34

7 – 8

9

18

48

42

17

Weighted average

38

38

29

40

24

Average Rate of Returns by Year of Sale   1880-18925

Year of sale

Acres sold

Forfeited land (acres)

Total value (£)

Average price per acre (£)

Average investment period (months)

Average net rate of return (%)

1880

1881

90

6,200

68.9

13.5

4.1

1882

435

17,326

39.8

10.4

49.7

1883

98

7,340

74.9

8.4

41.4

1884

510

54,356

106.6

24.5

10.0

1885

395

65,751

166.5

36.7

46.5

1886

208

41,620

200.1

31.3

50.3

1887

313

93,531

298.8

36.7

78.3

1888

780

238,152

305.3

46.8

38.4

1889

334

111,902

335.0

58.0

30.2

1890

1,699

262,535

154.5

60.8

18.2

1891

42

41

29,370

699.3

23.8

8.4

1892

15

742

9,750

650.0

83.2

-7.1

Total

4,919

783

937,833

Weighted average

190.7

43.8

34.6

Average Rate of Returns by Year of Purchase   1880-1892

Year of sale

Acres purchased

Total value (£)

Average price per acre (£)

Average investment period (months)

Average net rate of return (%)

1880

1,510

24,585

16.3

89.1

21.4

1881

317

11,546

36.4

40.8

46.2

1882

1,160

42,052

36.2

41.8

33.6

1883

671

68,540

102.2

57.1

33.4

1884

512

58,547

114.4

49.5

65.5

1885

342

64,593

188.9

23.9

47.2

1886

376

65,798

175.2

41.7

43.4

1887

458

75,173

164.1

19.5

43.3

1888

1,170

194,036

165.8

33.7

-3.9

1889

48

17,837

371.6

18.3

-9.1

1890

1891

1892

Total

6,564

622,707

Weighted average

94.9

43.8

34.6

Average Rate of Return –  Melbourne Land Investment vs Interest Rates   and Market Yields 1881-18916

Year

Average rate of return on urban land (%)

Trading bank deposit rate (12 month deposit   %)

Commercial paper rate (90 days %)

Trading bank overdraft rate (%)

Mining stock yields (%)

1881

4.1

3.5

5.5

7.0

27.9

1882

49.7

4.8

6.3

8.0

29.8

1883

41.4

6.0

7.0

9.0

31.8

1884

10.0

5.3

6.5

9.0

31.2

1885

46.5

5.0

6.5

9.0

33.7

1886

50.3

5.5

7.3

9.0

25.9

1887

78.3

4.5

7.0

8.5

31.2

1888

38.4

5.0

7.0

8.5

27.2

1889

30.2

5.0

7.0

9.0

26.7

1890

18.2

4.0

7.0

9.0

6.2

1891

8.4

5.0

7.3

8.5

11.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table notes 

1 Does not include number of acres involved in lot sub-division or forfeited land. From the total of 11,483 acres purchased and re-sold, 6,564 acres represented purchased acreage and 4,919 acres were resold at complete estates or in large blocks.

2 The total only refers to the value of land bought and resold as entire estates or as large blocks.

3 Advertising was normally required to sell land sold in lots. A lot subdivider was not required to provide public utilities under law, meaning the price of lots was unlikely to significantly differ from other categories of land.

4 A = average rate of return (%); B = average investment period (months).

5 The totals for ‘Acres sold’ and ‘Total value (£)’ refers only to land bought and resold as large blocks or in whole i.e. excluding the value of acreage involved in allotment sales.

6 Arithmetic averages for bank deposits, commercial paper and over-draft rates. Yields on mining stocks use the share value in the middle of September for Victorian gold-mining companies only. Estimated rates of return on land are not directly comparable to rates of return on mining investment because the latter relates to current yields while the former relates to annual average compound rates of return.

Conclusion

Economists should bear witness to history and take note of the many parallels between modern economic conditions and investor behavior, and those which prevailed prior to severe economic depressions of the past. While it may be an inconvenient fact, modern day Australia appears to have followed the 1880s path of destruction, mal-investing a huge sum of private sector funds into unproductive land speculation. With a similar euphoria present in today’s investor herd, prices have deviated from all semblance of rationality and have only been sustained by credit acceleration from aggressive bidding by greater fools. A permanently high plateau is not possible in land prices, as it is the expectation of future rises that is required to maintain them. Therefore, as the land bubble deflates, Australians are likely to reap a bitter harvest of falling housing prices, rising credit defaults, rising banking stress and unemployment. Moreover, the unprecedented size of the credit bubble and associated mal-investment implies a longer and more severe downturn than has previously been recorded awaits us.

References

Fisher, Chay and Christopher Kent. (1999). “Two Depressions, One Banking Collapse,” Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney.

Hickson, Charles R. and John D. Turner. (2002). “Free banking gone awry: the Australian banking crisis of 1893,” Financial History Review, 9(2): 147-167.

Silberberg, R. (1975). “Rates of Return on Melbourne Land Investment, 1880-92,” The Economic Record, June 1975: 203-217.

Simon, John. (2003). “Three Australian Asset-price Bubbles,” in Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney.


[1] Based upon excerpts from a forthcoming publication by Paul Egan and Philip Soos.

[2] Hickson and Turner (2002: 159).

[3]Fisher and Kent (1999: 22); Silberberg (1975: 206); Simon (2003: 21). Nominal figure.

[4] Silberberg (1975: 203-217).

[5] Fisher and Kent (1999: 22).

[6] Silberberg (1975: 207-208, 210, 212, 214, 216 – Tables I to VII).

 

 

HARRISON ARTICLE: A CLEAR-SIGHTED WAY TO SEE THE NEW YEAR IN

FredHarrisonThe following article is to be published shortly in the widely-circulated Chinese “Journal of Translation from Foreign Literature of Economics”.

Financial Rules for Constructing a Strong State

Fred Harrison

China is now in the unique position of being able to learn from the tragedies of Western nations, to create a post-capitalist society based on the freedom and equality of all citizens. This can be achieved if the financial system is constructed on respect for the division between what the individual citizen may retain as private property, and what must be recognised as the property of society. Western nation-states failed to honour that distinction. The result was the evolution of politically Weak States, which were hostages of a statecraft based on greed.

Property rights, and their impact on the distribution of a nation’s income, were long ago recognised as being at the root of socially significant problems (like the division of the population into classes, the institutionalisation of poverty, and systematic degradation of natural habitats). That is why Western political philosophers wrestled with the problem of property ever since the ancient Greeks. They attempted to identify the terms on which to combine a strong State with freedom of the individual. How can power be shaped to serve the best interests of both the individual and of the State? Ancient civilisations failed to develop solutions of the kind that could sustain their societies.

Plato, in his Republic (Chapter 5), chose to avoid the problem by abolishing property. The power to make decisions would rest with the people who were trained as the guardians of society. In this utopian state, the people had to trust the guardians to act for the common good. But no society has succeeded in creating sustainable arrangements in which private property was abolished. So the problem of how to reconstruct power remains with us. Effective reforms are impossible without first understanding why private property is the cause of problems like endemic poverty. Before we can elaborate an answer to that question, we need to define what is meant by a strong State.

A strong State is one that is not vulnerable to manipulation by influential groups. Or, to put it another way, a strong State is one in which the population is composed of citizens who are equal. No one group of people can exercise undemocratic influence to secure privileges at the expense of others.

Military power is not an indicator of a strong State. A State that relies on coercive power to maintain order is in a weak position. It is a weak State because it has to either use force to control its citizens, or to deploy force against other nations to capture natural resources to satisfy the demands of its social elites.

A Strong State, then, is one that evolves on the basis of three principles.

  1. It does not need to exercise coercive power over its citizens to maintain civil order.
  2. It is authorised by the people to administer civil society on the basis of treating everyone as equals, as determined by the principles of natural justice.
  3. Its mandate is to produce and renew the social infrastructure that people, as individuals, cannot provide for themselves.

Nation building is complex. Social equilibrium, expressed as a practical balance in the distribution of power, needs to be achieved between the public and private sectors in the economy, between government and the population in politics, between materialism and morality in aesthetics. This means that freedom does not turn into anarchy, and order is not imposed by the tools of despotism. This ideal system has not yet been achieved in the West, and the principles for its achievement have eluded philosophers. That is why they have relieved themselves of their frustrations by seeking solace in utopian escapism. Can we now specify the conditions for emancipating the creativity of all members of society in ways that would constitute a fair and efficient system, as represented by our notion of a strong State?

The Role of Rent

At the heart of the challenge is the way in which a society owns and uses the resource that is needed to create and sustain the culture of the people. That resource is a flow of value, or income, which does not include

  1. the income needed to sustain the individual household economy; and
  2. the income needed to form capital, which raises the productivity of labour.

What is that flow of value called, and where does it come from? Through the genius of people in the earliest civilisations, a sophisticated market mechanism was created to identify that part of a population’s resources that were not the wages of Labour or the profits of Capital. In classical political economy, that third category is called economic rent. The earliest urban civilisations emerged when rents were reserved to fund the infrastructure required by complex settlements.

A healthy society achieves sustainable equilibrium when rents are allocated and used to fund the “common good”. It is when rents are privatised that society shifts towards despotism. So it is critical for the long-term survival of society that the correct rules are elaborated to

  1. measure and collect rents as they are produced;
  2. decide how to spend the rents; and
  3. guarantee everyone’s equal access to the benefits that flow from the expenditure of those rents.

By studying how a nation resolves these issues, we are able to infer the character of its culture. That information reveals the nature of personal freedoms, the quality of governance, how the natural habitat is treated, and whether the State is fit for its purpose of serving the whole population.

In Europe, about 500 years ago, a few people (the feudal aristocrats) began to appropriate the rents for their personal use. One result was the perversion of the two pricing mechanisms:

  1. prices charged in private markets for consumer goods, and
  2. prices (taxes) charged to fund public services.

By resolving the contradictions that create the tensions between these two pricing mechanisms, it is possible to integrate the public and private sectors so that they work together in harmony.

At present, people who earn their incomes by working in the private sector are hostile to government, because of what they perceive as the injustices associated with the taxes they pay. This creates social stresses that weaken the State. The objective of good governance should be to synchronise the two pricing mechanisms so that they complement each other. The goal is maximum satisfaction for individual citizens and the welfare of society.

The Volume of Rent

This thesis places a heavy burden on rent as a stream of revenue. So the first practical question is this: does a population generate sufficient rent to fund all the public services they need? There is no reliable answer to this question in the economic literature. Why? Most governments devote substantial funds to statistically measure activity in their economies, so why is the flow of rent as a percentage of national income a mystery? The answer reveals something important about the distribution of power in society. To work out the facts, we have to go back to the origins of the modern economy and the politics of State formation.

In the 17th century, an English philosopher, John Locke, wrote Two Treatises on Government (1689). This was a seminal document. It influenced the politicians who shaped the formation of the liberal State. It was quoted by the Founding Fathers of the United States of America. Locke argued that, in the state of nature, every person had a natural right to “life, liberty, and estate” (estate was the old English word for land). He argued that people consented to enter into civil society to protect their property. But nature – planet Earth – could not be privately owned. Why? Because people could only own as private property those things in which they had mixed their labour. So, viewed in terms of a flow of income, according to Locke there were two categories: the income of labour, and that share of income that could be attributed to nature.

To determine the legitimate distribution of income, we need to know the value that has to be assigned to the services delivered by nature (like the fossil fuels that yield energy that can be translated as the rents of oil, or of coal, or of the power of wind). On this issue Locke was less than honest. It appears that he did not wish to disappoint the aristocrats who controlled the public budget. For he claimed, in Chapter 5 of his Treatise, that the rent attributable to nature was just 1% of total income. The rest (99% of the flow of national income) was value created by the labour of the individual. He remained silent on the value created by the services of society. Today, the West’s economists claim in their textbooks that rent ranges from 1% to 6% of national income (drawing on USA data).

Nobel Prize economist Paul Krugman claims that, in 2004, the USA apparently generated “rent” of just 1% of total income (Krugman and Wells 2006: 283). Examples spanning the years since 1945 reveal how statistics were manipulated to under-state the quantum of rent.

Nobel Prize economist Paul Samuelson published the first edition of Economics in 1948. Charging rents for the use of natural resources, he explained, “may slow down their rate of depletion and serve to ration out such scarce, exhaustible resources. But in a freely competitive system, the self-interest of owners may well lead to the rapid using up of natural resources…. Unsightly and unhealthy slag piles may also be created…There may be deforestation that causes floods and soil erosion downstream…” (Samuelson 1955: 539). This is a scary prognosis! But aren’t these abuses of nature associated with the current fiscal regime, which largely fails to charge rent for the use of those resources? Samuelson does concede that “Pure land rent is in the nature of a ‘surplus’ which can be taxed heavily without distorting production incentives or efficiency” (1955: 535). But why bother to isolate rent as a special income category when the “Rent income of persons” is shown (on page 182) as just 3% of Net National Product? Not enough revenue here to fund public services!

In a later edition of Economics co-authored with a Yale professor, Samuelson reports the “Rent income of persons” as less than 2% of Gross National Product (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1985: 115). Drawing revenue from pure rents might be fair, and might be efficient, but the sum is obviously too trivial to target!

In 1963, Richard Lipsey’s textbook assured students that “an effective tax on economic rent would finance only a tiny portion of government expenditures” (Lipsey 1979: 371). Besides, there was a grave problem with the proposal: “The policy implications of taxing rent depends on being able in practice to identify economic rent. At best, this is difficult; at worst, it is impossible” (1979: 370, emphasis added). Real estate professionals perform this exercise every day for their clients, but in Western universities the students are taught that the task is impossible!

Heinz Kohler, a Germany economist, repeats the myths about not being able to isolate economic rent, and that rents would not yield sufficient revenue to cover government expenses (Kohler 1992: 857). His textbook is an example of the damage such manuals inflict on people who need to live in the real world. He claims that, when California imposed a limit on increases in the tax on real estate in 1978, by the mid-1980s “an unexpected consequence had emerged” (Kohler 1992: 859, n.13). For every $1 decrease in the property tax, property values rose by $7. Why were economists surprised at this outcome? Fiscal reformers predicted that holding down the property tax would translate into higher prices for residential land. They were correct. But for academics in their intellectual fortresses, this result could not be anticipated. So California’s voters were not guided away from what proved to be a disastrous decision for families who needed homes that they could afford.

The reality is that rent constitutes something like 50% of a modern nation’s income. How can we validate this claim?

To excavate the truth, we have to return to the writings of John Locke. He examined the financial impact of taxes. In Some Considerations of the Lowering of Interest and the Raising the Value of Money (1691), he explained that it would be “in vain” for a country to impose taxes on anything other than land, for “there at least it will terminate”. The merchant won’t bear taxes, and the labourer on subsistence wages cannot bear them. So taxes are passed on, through the marketplace, in the form of higher prices. But someone must pay! Who? Locke was emphatic: taxes are ultimately drawn out of a nation’s rents (Locke’s reasoning appears in full in Harrison 2012: 184). This leads to an important economic insight. Taxes, if they are imposed on Labour and Capital to be paid out of wages and profits, reduce the income left in the hands of labourers and the owners of capital. This means they have less income left to pay as rent to land owners.

Locke’s thesis tells us something of vital importance about the nature of the revenue that is collected as taxes on labour and capital. In reality, that revenue is rent in disguise. We see the dynamics of this reality at work every day, as when a government reduces a tax on wages or profits. The net gain does not surface as higher real wages for labour, or real returns for capital. Through the competitive process, the gains are translated into higher rents paid to those who own the land.

In the past, land owners who controlled tax policy did not welcome Locke’s insight. They wanted to believe that, by cutting the Land Tax and imposing taxes on their peasant populations (such as the tax on the consumption of salt), they could reduce the share of the rent they paid to the State. That appeared to be the case, but it was all appearances. For, at the same time, the amount of rent the peasants could pay to their landlords was reduced. It was this struggle to control rent that caused social chaos in the form of mass unemployment, the under-production of wealth, debt and inflation and the division of the population into hostile classes. That struggle remains with us in the West to this day.

Adding up Rent

Locke’s thesis is most thoroughly explored by Mason Gaffney, who taught economics at the University of California. He formulated an acronym for Locke’s thesis: ATCOR. All taxes come out of rent (see Addendum).

The first step in calculating the size of a nation’s rents is to establish the amount people pay through “taxes” levied by government. In 2013, tax revenues collected by US federal, state and local governments added up to $5.3 trillion (GDP: $16.2 trillion). Using the ATCOR formula, we may conclude that, if America was a tax-free zone, this revenue would surface in the marketplace as rent. In other words, under present tax policies, about one-third of US income is transformed from rent into “wages” and “profits” via painful political illusions.

But if revenue collected by government is ultimately out of rent, why bother to collect that revenue directly? One reason is that collecting rent directly would raise the productivity of the population. Why? Because (to use the technical term) taxes cause “deadweight losses”. The gains from abolishing taxes on wages and collecting rents in a direct way to fund public services would have an enormous impact on people’s lives. Nicolaus Tideman, a professor of economics at Virginia Tech and State University, estimates that, after five years into the fiscal reform, the average American family would be better off by $6,300 (Tideman 2013).

Rents in Private Pockets

*  The next question relates to the proportion of a nation’s revenue that is visible as rent. This is rent that is not collected by government. Western economists have no idea how much rent remains in private ownership. The prudent estimate is that rents in private pockets amount to about 20% of national income. In the UK, researchers found that rent was 22% of national income in 1985, rising to 29% in 1989 (Banks 1989: 40, Table 2:II). But 1989 was a peak year in the property cycle. Rents dropped in the recession of 1992. Allowing for the distortions caused by land speculation, the “normal” year estimate for the UK would be for 1987: 21.8%.

*  In Australia, researchers – armed with one of the best official data sets in the world – calculated that rent in private hands in 2012 was about 24% of GDP (Putland 2013; Fitzgerald 2013). Rents in that year were inflated by abnormally high urban and commodity prices (this was one of the ripple effects of trade with China).

If we conservatively assume that privately collected rents are about 20% of national income, what would be a robust estimate for the value of all rents generated by mature industrial economies today?

If we take a random selection of 10 rich nations, ranging from Australia through the USA to Sweden, Germany and Japan, the average tax-take as a percent of GDP is 37%. In ATCOR terms, most of this is rent in its disguised form (collected as if they were “wages” and “profits”). If we add to this the rent that is not collected by government, of around 20%, we discover that rent exceeds 50% of national income. This first approximation of rent needs to be adjusted.

  1. Taxes distort the total income. They encourage the under-use of urban land (which artificially raises rents). Tax policy also motivates behaviour in ways that damage the environment, as when polluters are not obliged to pay for dumping waste into the atmosphere (which artificially reduces rents in some urban locations).
  1. A small part of tax revenue may actually come out of wages, because the workers lack the bargaining power to shift the taxes onto rent.
  1. Revenue currently collected by the property tax falls largely on economic rent.

Taking such considerations into account, we may cautiously estimate that rent is about 50% of total income. This is more than sufficient to cover existing government financial obligations.

History and Public Finance

Citizens are intuitively aware that there is something fundamentally wrong with tax policy. In England a thousand years ago, the State’s revenue was exclusively from rent; 500 years ago, the land grabbers got to work. The chart below tracks the reduction of rent as a proportion of public revenue. It records how England became a weak State with a dishonest form of governance. Evidence of this weakness can be inferred from the way land owners exercised power to manipulate laws to secure special privileges from the State.

Europe’s weak States were responsible for two world wars. And yet, the knowledge needed to avoid such outcomes was available to statesmen in the 18th century. The Industrial Revolution made it possible for everyone to prosper. What went wrong may be illustrated with the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), a civil servant who established the University of Berlin. In The Limits of State Action, first published in 1852, he sought to describe how the State could be controlled.

Individual freedom, von Humboldt argued, was maximised when education was tailored to treat people as ends, not means. The State’s role was to help people realise their potential. But how could citizens constrain the State, which commanded the instruments of coercion? Von Humboldt is not convincing in his answers. According to my thesis, revenue is the key.

The State needs revenue to fund public services, as von Humboldt noted. But on what terms would that revenue be raised? Who decided how the revenue is raised, and how much is handed to government? The answers are to be found in the unique character of rent, and the social function performed by the land market. Through that market, the people themselves negotiate the rents they are able to pay to use the ecological and social services available at each location. By this process of free negotiation, who paid, and how much they paid, is determined by citizens, not politicians or servants of the State.

In the 18th century, the French Physiocrat school of philosophy explained that rent was the correct source of revenue for the State. Adam Smith repeated this recommendation in The Wealth of Nations (1776). But while von Humboldt confessed his “ignorance of everything concerned with finance” (1993: 134), he felt free to pronounce on tax policy. The Physiocratic rent policy was “unquestionably the simplest” way to raise revenue, he wrote, but “human power” must also be “subject likewise to direct taxation” (1993: 135: emphasis added).

If people like von Humboldt, who contributed to Germany’s zeitgeist, had helped to shape the State according to Physiocratic financial principles, that nation would have travelled a different path of social evolution. If everyone in Germany had enjoyed increased prosperity and social security, this happy state of affairs would not have led to the colonial land grab in Africa in competition with other European States (especially the UK, Spain, Portugal and Italy). It was that muscle-flexing mission which (among other reasons) was responsible for drawing a weak German State into war with its neighbours in 1914.

Transforming the Weak State

By restructuring the public’s finances, economic growth would be raised above historic rates. The important gains would take the form of

  1. more leisure for people,
  2. the freedom to deepen human relationships, and
  3. a stronger cultural membrane which wraps everyone in its riches (like the arts).

Politics would mutate into an authentic democratic process. Politicians would no longer be able to buy votes by funding projects which favoured special interests groups. The State would be strengthened on foundations of fairness.

In the West, the trend is in the opposite direction. In the 1980s, the trans-Atlantic nations began to shed their industrial status in favour of a rent-seeking culture. Whole populations now have to try to survive by participating in the arts of cheating. One example: the middle-class exercise in buying and selling houses to accumulate capital gains. This is a culture of cheating because it enables some people to live off the labours of others.

The Western State treats the land market as a slush fund. Either directly or indirectly, this rewards corrupt behaviour in the financial sector, in the media, law-enforcement agencies…. and, of course, in politics. The law on property rights legitimises the transfer of the common wealth to the privileged few, resulting in the rape of culture and the environment. An authentic democracy would not tolerate this tragedy. The People’s Republic of China need not become a victim of this social pathology, because it has passed a law which reserves land as public property. Its next step must be to guarantee that the rent that represents the services of nature and society are collected for the benefit of everyone in society.

Addendum

Mason Gaffney’s Writings

Mason Gaffney’s articles, essays and book chapters are accessible on www.masongaffney.org  On the ATCOR thesis, see the following:

Mason Gaffney (1999), “Gains from Untaxing Work, Trade and Capital by Uptaxing Land”, Global Institute for Taxation (GIFT) conference, St. Johns University, New York, October 1.

”            (2008), Keeping Land in Capital Theory: Ricardo, Faustmann, Wicksell and George, Am J of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 67(1).

”           (2005), “A Better Way of Gauging Excess Burden of Taxation”, Working paper – published in Moss (ed.), 2006.

”            (2006), “A simple general test for tax bias”, in Laurence S. Moss (ed.), Natural Resources, Taxation and Regulation, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Gaffney, Mason (1994), in Mason Gaffney and Fred Harrison, The Corruption of Economics, London: Shepheard-Walwyn.

Mason Gaffney (2013), The Mason Gaffney Reader: Essays on Solving the “Unsolvable” (2013).

Prof. Gaffney explains the ATCOR issue on this video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nLUGEMu9-sA&feature=c4-overview&list=UUpBfQyuQ1N5YMFsWnS26kfw

References

Banks, Ronald (1989), Costing the Earth, London: Shepheard-Walwyn.

Fitzgerald, Karl (2013), Total Resource Rents of Australia, Melbourne: Prosper Australia.

Gwartney, Ted (n.d.) www.henrygeorge.org/ted.htm

Humboldt, Wilhelm von (1993), The Limits of State Action, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

Kohler, Heinz (1992), Economics, Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.

Krugman, Paul, and Robin Wells (2006), Economics, New York: Worth Publishers.

Lipsey, Richard G. (1963), Positive Economics, 5th edn. (1979), London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Putland, Gavin R. (2013) http://blog.lvrg.org.au/2013/07/economic-rent-of-land-as-fraction-of-oz-gdp.html

Samuelson, Paul (1955), Economics, 7th edn. (1967), NY: McGraw-Hill.

”          and William D. Nordhaus (1985), Economics, 12th edn., NY: McGraw-Hill

Tideman,Nicolaus (2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nLUGEMu9sA&list=TLW0JGVneIS95R2aRx8hoZCNBrzeZkGKZG

Biography of the Author:

Fred Harrison is a graduate of the Universities of Oxford and London. He is the author of many books on the economics of rent, including The Traumatised Society (London, 2012). He is Research Director of the Land Research Trust, London. He was the economist who gave a 10-year forecast of the economic crisis that began in 2008. He warned the British Government in 1997 that the West’s house price bubble would peak in 2007, followed by a collapse that would trigger a global depression.

 

From “The Victorian Baptist” Melbourne, April 1890

The motive of Mr Henry George’s mission to the colonies is one which all philanthropic minds must approve. His purpose is to better the condition of that large mass of mankind, who, whilst a smaller section of their fellows is revelling in superfluity, are condemned to what he calls the “hell of poverty“. His fundamental position is that the Great Father has given in the land an ample estate for all, and that the few who claim it for themselves to the exclusion of others are guilty of injustice.

Addressing quite lately the Baptist Ministers’ Meeting at Philadelphia, he contended:-

The want that festers in our centres is not the fault of God. The fault is with men; it is in our institutions. We are animals; we are land animals. It is only from the land that men can live. Man is a maker; he is the only animal that brings things forth. He cannot create; God alone creates. The first human being who came here was a naked man. In his powers lay the potentiality of all that has since been produced. Land is the passive factor in production, as man is the active factor. Now, suppose the land is made the property of a part of the people. We will have wealth on one side and poverty on the other. Give me the land; and I am the master, and men are my slaves. Slavery claimed the right to make one man work for another, without giving him an equivalent. This is what the landlord does. When I am forced to give my labour for that which God has created, that is robbery. In England, Scotland and Ireland, you find good men, God-fearing men, slaving away all their days for the merest necessaries and other creatures living in luxury on their work, proud neither they nor their fathers have ever done anything. This is worse than negro slavery: hunger is more cruel than the lash or the bloodhound. We have not abolished slavery; the more insidious form remains.

We make private property of what God intended for all His children. No Christian dare deny that every human being comes into the world with an equal right to the land.” As illustrating the innate propriety of this claim, Mr. George cites the following naive claim of an unsophisticated aboriginal:-

In New Zealand, the English Government bought the land of the Maories. Then presently a woman with a baby would come along and say, ‘I want to be paid for the land that belongs to this baby.’ The English would say, ‘We have bought the land and paid for it.’ ‘Oh, no; you bought our land, but you did not buy this baby’s land. You could not; he was not born then, and he wants his land.’ The fact of existence is a title to as much land as is needed for one’s support.”

He urges that the right to possess unused land so as to exclude those who need it for their sustenance, is as absurd as to claim possession of so much sea. “A man may not claim the fish which I have caught out of the ocean; but he may claim the right to fish in the sea. The products of the land belong to the individual; the land itself belongs to the community.”

His ideal condition of things would be one in which the State retained from the first formal possession of the land as trustees of the people. As such they would lease, as perpetual landlords, the land at such prices as would prevent any person caring to retain more than would actually meet his requirements, whilst the increase in value which population would foster would pass to those who would be the cause of the enlarged value. The huge difficulty is that in nearly every State under heaven the rights of property in land have been conceded, and could not be wrested from their possessors without a revolution too violent to bear thinking about. Mr George anticipates this objection. The abolition of private titles and nationalising all land is a method advocated (in conjunction with the compensation of present holders) by no less an authority than Herbert Spencer. Mr. George, however, repudiates the claim for compensation as unjust, and consequently sees how shocking and unworkable would be any scheme the initiation of which involves the annihilation of all existing titles, and their merging into one great national possession. He would neither purchase nor confiscate private property in land.

Men shall continue to call it their land and sell and bequeath it, but they shall no longer receive the rent. “It is not necessary to confiscate land, it is only necessary to confiscate rent“, and the panacea for all social ills growing out of the maladministration of landed property is discovered in the appropriation of rent by taxation. The land shall be taxed according to its value. If of no value, no tax. If of little value, a little tax. If of large value, a large tax.

By this means the whole value of the land would be appropriated by the State, preventing speculation in land, replenishing the public coffers, throwing open the land to those who really need it, and making its retention impossible to those who would fain keep it for unearned increments.

By this tax he would supersede all other methods of taxation and meet all requirements of government. “Under the plan proposed, a man who has a lot will then have to pay as much as if he had a house on it. This will remove the temptation to corruption. The land lies out of doors; it cannot be hid; its value can be ascertained more exactly than the value of anything else. If you choose, you can put up a sign,. ‘This land, so many feet by so many, belonging to AB, is assessed at so much’. If it is assessed at too much, the man himself will complain; if too little, his neighbours will complain. Thus we can get rid of oaths, and we should get rid of many bad officials.” The money thus levied would go to make the commonwealth rich, instead of enriching the few who, by extortionate rents, keep the many poor.

We should like to see Mr. George’s theories reduced to practice and so tested. It will be a bold community which first does so. Nothing, however, will so cogently convince men of its worth as a good experiment. Socialism tested its vaunted power to rectify all human ills, and issued in the three failures of Robert Owen its great apostle. It proved itself incapable, in Britain and America, of producing the effects which its advocate promised to his followers.

Our own conviction is that the great evil, the root of every wrong, is found in what Mr George calls the other “active factor ” in all production namely, man himself. To better the condition of man is, without controversy, a Christlike object, and worthy of every Christian, but we must better the man simultaneously, or every alleviation of his lot will only give him larger opportunity for a life self-centered, God defiant! Mr George’s aims are worthy. He has secured the respectful hearing of large numbers of the best men in America, and he is doing the same in Australia, and if his scheme is at all feasible, he will doubtless find that his most reliable allies will be the men who call Christ “Master and Lord”.

One unfortunate circumstance makes Victoria give but small promise of practical response to his appeals. Its interests have been and are so intimately bound up with the protection of the products of labour by taxation, that it will require powers of persuasion superhuman, to induce a reversal of this policy. South Australia has also committed herself to a similar policy. Perhaps New South Wales will listen to his siren song, and immolate herself in an experiment which is said to have in it the promise of all possible social adjustments. Doubtless Victoria will cautiously follow her lead in view of such an outcome. Meantime, we cannot withhold our admiration of the well- intentioned efforts of Mr Henry George to put things right – from our point of view an achievement only very partially practicable.

Our very best can only issue in rectifications very inadequate in power, and limited in range. We want the presence of “the Proper Man”. Nevertheless, our heart goes out with a hearty “God speed you” to every endeavour to minimise human wrongs, with their consequent suffering.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Unfortunately, a quite fair account of the need to capture the rent of land for revenue is subverted by the obfuscation found in the last four paragraphs of this 1890 report on the occasion of Henry George’s visit to Australia.  One hundred and twenty-four years later, all religions obsequiously skirt around the tenets of Henry George, although they were held by most great philosophers, and were originally fundamental and integral to most religions.

How the great religions have backslid, simply to appease the powerful 0.1%!

Kavanagh-Putland Index bounces on low interest rates

We’re a little late this year, but the intrepid Gavin Putland today delivered a Christmas present–the Kavanagh-Putland Index–the full untrammeled details of which are to be found here.

For further interest, I’ve made additions in pink below. These shows recessions, and pointers to what may be Australia’s upcoming biggie. This year’s kick-up in the total volume of all real estate sales prices to GDP remains within the channel I see as directing us towards the inevitable popping of our bubble.

Have a merry Christmas, folks!  I surely intend to do so.   🙂

kpi1-2013 trend

 

AUSTRALIA BECOMES DETROIT: FORD AND HOLDEN GONE …. TOYOTA NEXT?

autowages

PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION FINDINGS and my comments

It costs too much to produce cars in Australia. Too few are produced in our three assembly plants.

Labour costs aren’t much higher than in Germany or Japan, but they’re four times dearer than in China, Thailand and other developing countries.

Er, wait on … haven’t Germany and Japan done OK selling their cars? So, maybe something else may be wrong in Australia? Something like we’re in too much mortgage debt to replace the car?

Worldwide, production of cars exceeds demand.

Really? There aint a lot people about who’d like a car–or want to replace their old car? Surely, you mean there’s not sufficient effective demand worldwide? Maybe this is not over-production but under-consumption?

Maybe the problem is that most Australians (and many people worldwide) haven’t the wherewithal, the scratch, to buy cars because the credit card is maxed out. Some might say we’re in a depression.

And haven’t tax regimes that favour inflating land bubbles and fining producers and purchasers got something to do with that state of affairs?

The Henry Tax Review thought so, and recommended instead of taxing labour and capital–mobile factors of production–that we should change the emphasis to immobile land, including minerals.

Maybe Ken Henry was onto something, Productivity Commission? Maybe that’s where we can cut our costs astronomically, because taxes and their deadweight cascade right throughout the Australian economy and add vastly to costs.  (Land rents don’t do this, guys!)

If we heed Ken Henry’s recommendations maybe Australia would start manufacturing again?